MEWEMIND: An Ontological Reconsideration of Mental Modeling

MEWEMIND: An Ontological Reconsideration of Mental Modeling

— Human Beings as Relational from the Beginning

 

Sukjae Lee, Ph.D.   
Creator of the Effectiveness Coaching Methodology   
Feburary 4, 2026

 

Abstract

Despite the proliferation of sophisticated change models in coaching, leadership, and organizational development, sustainable transformation remains elusive. This paper argues that such failures stem not from methodological inadequacy, but from an implicit ontological assumption that positions human beings as fundamentally separate and self-contained individuals. Drawing on relational ontology, systems thinking, and collective sensemaking literature, this conceptual paper introduces MEWEMIND as a descriptive framework that articulates human beings as inherently relational from the outset. MEWEMIND reframes mental modeling not as a cognitive technique for reframing thoughts, but as an ontological recall of relational being. By situating individual reframing, team restructuring, and organizational reconstruction within this ontological ground, the paper offers a unifying foundation for more sustainable psychological and collective change. Implications for coaching practice, team dynamics, and organizational transformation are discussed.

Keywords

MEWEMIND; mental modeling; relational ontology; systems thinking; collective sensemaking; coaching psychology; organizational change

 

1. The Ontological Premise Preceding Mental Models

Theories of change typically begin with epistemic inquiries concerning assumptions, interpretations, and cognitive frames (Argyris & Schön, 1978; Senge, 1990). While these approaches have advanced understanding of learning and adaptation, they often presuppose a deeper, unexamined layer.

Prior to cognition, an ontological orientation is already operative—namely, an implicit answer to the question: What kind of being am I? This orientation functions less as explicit belief and more as a pre-reflective mode of self-perception (Heidegger, 1962).

In many contemporary organizational contexts, the dominant ontological premise implicitly frames individuals as isolated, self-responsible units. From this premise, mental models naturally converge toward competition, defense, efficiency, and optimization (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1999). These orientations are not ethical shortcomings but logical consequences of an atomistic ontology.

 

2. MEWEMIND as Ontological Discovery

MEWEMIND is proposed not as a normative ideal nor as a socially constructed value system, but as a descriptive recognition of relational being. This position aligns with relational ontologies that conceptualize human existence as fundamentally constituted through relationships rather than as pre-social individuality (Buber, 1958; Gergen, 2009).

The inversion from ME to WE signifies not a cognitive reframing alone, but an ontological reorientation. Importantly, MEWEMIND does not negate individuality; instead, it suggests that when individuality is examined at its deepest experiential level, relationality is already present.

Thus, WE is neither the outcome of consensus nor the product of institutional design. It is an ontological condition that precedes social contracts and organizational structures (Emirbayer, 1997).

 

3. WEness at the Limit of Self-Awareness

Self-awareness is commonly conceptualized as enhanced insight into one’s internal states, motivations, and behavioral patterns (Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002). However, when self-awareness is pursued beyond narrative identity and psychological traits, a qualitative shift emerges.

At this threshold, individuals begin to recognize that their experiences and decisions are embedded within broader relational systems. Such realizations resonate with systems thinking perspectives, which emphasize interdependence, feedback loops, and co-emergence within human systems (Senge, 1990; Meadows, 2008).

WEness, in this sense, is not a moral stance but a perceptual correction—a more accurate apprehension of systemic reality. MEWEMIND names this transition point where self-awareness becomes relational awareness.

 

4. Reframing and the Ontological Position of the Observer

Reframing is widely employed in coaching and psychotherapy as a cognitive intervention aimed at altering perspective (Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974). However, without an ontological shift in the perceived position of the observer, reframing risks degenerating into sophisticated self-justification.

MEWEMIND introduces a prior inquiry: whether the self is understood as a detached observer or as an already-embedded participant within relational systems. This distinction parallels sensemaking theory, which emphasizes that meaning is constructed retrospectively within social contexts rather than by isolated individuals (Weick, 1995).

Ontological misalignment at this level explains why reframing often terminates in defensiveness rather than transformation.

 

5. Implications for Teams and Organizations

From a systems perspective, teams and organizations are not aggregates of individuals but relational configurations that co-produce behavior and meaning (Katz & Kahn, 1978). When team members implicitly operate from an atomistic ontology, collaboration deteriorates regardless of skill or structure.

Similarly, organizational exhaustion and disengagement cannot be fully explained by structural inefficiencies alone. They reflect a deeper assumption that treats human beings as separable resources rather than relational participants (Ghoshal, 2005).

Reconstruction efforts lacking an explicit relational ontology may succeed technically while failing relationally—a pattern frequently observed in large-scale change initiatives.

 

6. Beyond Moral Interpretation

MEWEMIND is often misread as an ethical appeal toward collectivism. This interpretation obscures its ontological intent. MEWEMIND does not claim that people ought to be relational; it asserts that people already are relational.

Empirical research on collective sensemaking demonstrates that decisions, successes, and failures emerge from interactional processes rather than individual cognition alone (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). MEWEMIND situates these findings within an explicit ontological frame.

 

7. Mental Modeling as Ontological Recall

Within this framework, mental modeling must be redefined. Rather than a technique for cognitive adjustment, mental modeling becomes a practice of ontological recall—restoring awareness of relational being.

Only upon this foundation can individual reframing transcend egocentrism, team restructuring move beyond control, and organizational reconstruction avoid alienation. MEWEMIND thus functions as the implicit ground upon which sustainable transformation becomes possible.

Conclusion

Persistent failures in organizational change do not primarily result from individual selfishness or resistance. They stem from an ontological mischaracterization of human beings as isolated entities.

MEWEMIND reverses this mischaracterization by articulating a relational ontology in which WE is already present within ME. This realization represents not the beginning of thought, but its furthest reach.

 

References

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Buber, M. (1958). I and Thou (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Scribner.

Emirbayer, M. (1997). Manifesto for a relational sociology. American Journal of Sociology, 103(2), 281–317.

Gergen, K. J. (2009). Relational being: Beyond self and community. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Ghoshal, S. (2005). Bad management theories are destroying good management practices. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 4(1), 75–91.

Ghoshal, S., & Bartlett, C. A. (1999). The individualized corporation. New York, NY: HarperBusiness.

Grant, A. M., Franklin, J., & Langford, P. (2002). The self-reflection and insight scale. Social Behavior and Personality, 30(8), 821–836.

Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). New York, NY: Harper & Row. (Original work published 1927)

Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. (1978). The social psychology of organizations (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Wiley.

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Senge, P. M. (1990). The fifth discipline: The art and practice of the learning organization. New York, NY: Doubleday.

Watzlawick, P., Weakland, J. H., & Fisch, R. (1974). Change: Principles of problem formation and problem resolution. New York, NY: Norton.

Weick, K. E. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M., & Obstfeld, D. (2005). Organizing and the process of sensemaking. Organization Science, 16(4), 409–421.